As BNSF Freight Locomotives Fail The Test - It's Time to Audit Metrolink Operations - 2016

 

As BNSF Freight Locomotives Fail The Test - It's Time to Audit Metrolink Operations

At 5:39 AM on February 24, 2015, Metrolink Train No. 102 departed the Oxnard Transit Center. Its intended destination was Los Angeles Union Station (LAUS). After negotiating a sweeping arc of track, the train crossed Rose Ave., at Milepost 405 of the Coast Line. Leading the way was Hyundai-Rotem Cabcar No. 645. After negotiating the initial curve, ten miles of straight track lay ahead. Under the control of a student engineer, the diesel pusher train quickly accelerated to seventy miles per hour.

With Metrolink Sr. Engineer Glenn Steele occupying a jump seat behind the student engineer, it would be less than one minute before the cabcar reached Rice Ave. at Milepost 406.23. Unknown to the engineer and his student, an abandoned Ford F-450 work truck lay high-centered on the tracks eighty feet west of Rice Ave. In the early morning darkness, the headlights and emergency flashers of the disabled truck pointed toward the oncoming Metrolink train.

Until it was too late to avoid a collision, neither the student engineer nor Steele determined that the truck’s lights represented a hazard. While traveling at seventy miles per hour, and with less than three tenths of a mile to go, the student engineer saw the headlights looming before the cabcar. Sounding the horn and applying the brakes was insufficient to prevent a collision. On orders from Steele, the student applied emergency braking and both men bailed out, heading toward the rear of the cabcar.

With the brakes engaged, less than 1500 feet separated the cabcar and the work truck. As momentum carried the entire train forward, the impact with the truck was catastrophic. The pilot, a blade intended to clear debris from the tracks, detached from its support structure and disappeared beneath the cabcar. As the wreckage traveled along the tracks, the cabcar and its following coaches derailed and whipped in opposite directions. As the first two cars rotated and toppled on their sides, the whipsaw effect injured dozens of passengers and crew. One week later, Sr. Engineer Glenn Steele succumbed to his injuries.

In early reports, Metrolink touted the crash energy management (CEM) features of the Hyundai-Rotem cabcar. Without its safety features, a spokesperson said, the severity of the incident could have been greater. A preliminary report by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) made such statements seem hasty and ill informed. By September 2015, the NTSB had determined that both the steel within the pilot and welds in its structural supports were deficient. Further, the entire assembly had ripped loose at stress levels below its design criteria.

After receiving an NTSB report regarding failure of the pilot assembly, Metrolink officials skirted discussions regarding any potential design flaw or culpability in the collision. Instead, Metrolink management initiated a conference call with its board members. During that call, the Metrolink Board approved a one-year lease of forty BNSF freight locomotives at a total of $20,000 per day. According to Metrolink Chief Executive Art Leahy, the forty freight locomotives would soon head up all Metrolink trains on their return trips to LAUS. Using the “rule of tonnage”, Metrolink management wanted to rule out the possibility of another deficient pilot or cabcar causing injury in a collision. Lost in the publicity regarding this supposed safety measure was the fact that no regional rail carrier in the nation had ever utilized freight locomotives to head up passenger trains.

Citing the unprecedented, yet unspecified safety issues involved with the Hyundai Rotem cabcars, the Southern California Regional Rail Authority (Metrolink) Board sidestepped the California Open Meeting Law. That ill-conceived and illegal action set Metrolink on a path to its potential demise. It also put the executive management team at Metrolink in a position to either defend their actions or place blame on its own board or others yet unnamed.

On December 5, 2015, I attended the “Steel Wheels Conference”, which is the annual meeting for the rail passenger association known as RailPAC. The meeting convened at the Metro Headquarters Building adjacent to LAUS. While on a lunch break, I discovered a long line of BNSF freight locomotives parked on LAUS Track Number 14. With no room to spare in its maintenance yards, Metrolink had redirected at least sixteen of the leased BNSF locomotives to the depot.

In "The Purloined Letter", a short story by American author Edgar Allan Poe, detectives assumed that a blackmailer would conceal a damning letter in an elaborate hiding place. Thus, he hid it in plain sight. In a flash of chutzpah and hubris, the Metrolink executive team decided to hide almost 7,000,000 lb. of BNSF freight locomotives at LAUS.

Soon after their irrevocable one-year lease at $500 per day each ($7,300,000 total), Metrolink discovered that heavy freight locomotives are more expensive to outfit and operate than they originally thought. Although the BNSF locomotives already featured positive train control (PTC), the software version on the BNSF equipment was two generations beyond what Metrolink was using (version 0 vs. 2.0). A new train management computer (TMC) and retrofitted software were required for each BNSF locomotive placed into service. By late December 2015, BNSF locomotives entered into limited service on Metrolink lines. Almost immediately, problems developed with their operation.

With a gross weight of 420,000 lb., an overall length of seventy-four feet and a wheel diameter of forty-two inches, the huge locomotives had difficulty negotiating ten-degree radius curves such as the one approaching Chatsworth Station. As a result, the wheel-trucks on the BNSF locomotives create premature wear on the inside edge of the outboard rail. In a metallurgical process known as spalling, the BNSF wheels shave steel filings off the rails. The dispersion of filings into nearby electrical shunts often shorts out the signal systems along those tight curves.

Although the horns on the BNSF locomotives fall within legal standards, their blaring pitch can make them sound louder than a regular Metrolink horn. With their twelve drive-wheels and massive sixteen cylinder turbocharged diesel engines, the BNSF freight locomotives are louder and create more vibration than their passenger locomotive counterparts. In addition, regardless of their direction of travel, both the BNSF and the Metrolink locomotives generate power, noise and pollution whenever a Metrolink train moves. Despite Metrolink's claims of environmental sensitivity, a double-ender Metrolink train produces almost twice the engine noise and twice the pollution of a single-engine train.

Because of the unprecedented use of freight locomotives in their train consists, Metrolink obtained only a six-month temporary waiver to utilize the BNSF equipment. A stipulation of the temporary waiver was that Metrolink would maintain compliance with all positive train control (PTC) regulations as specified by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). With a few of the BNSF locomotives entering service prior to January 1, 2016, their six-month temporary waiver shall soon expire. When the temporary waiver expires, will the FRA recertify the freight locomotives under rules for passenger use or will it require a full audit of their operations?

One requirement of PTC is that the speedometer on each locomotive shall be accurate at any speed above thirty miles per hour. With a freight locomotive geared for long hauls and a top speed of seventy miles per hour, the stipulated variance of five miles per hour (plus or minus) is difficult to achieve. For example, frequent starts, stops and delays for other rail traffic make the use of freight locomotives on the San Fernando Valley line problematic. Often operating at just above the thirty mile per hour threshold, a wide variety of speed sensors can cause the TMC to place the locomotive into “penalty mode”. Once it enters penalty mode, the TMC automatically applies the brakes and stops the train, no matter where it may be along the tracks.

Before the penalized locomotive can resume service, pumps must refill the air reservoirs that supply breaking power to the train. A locomotive that experiences a penalty can stay in service for the balance of that day. However, a penalized locomotive may not reenter passenger service the following day unless Metrolink corrects the anomaly (inaccurate speedometer) and certifies completion of that work. According to the Los Angeles Times, Metrolink was able to average only twelve BNSF freight locomotives in service per day during April 2016. With so few BNSF locomotives in service, the majority of Metrolink trains returning to LAUS are headed-up by Hyundai-Rotem cabcars. This also begs the question; where are the remaining thirty-eight BNSF locomotives?

After the embarrassment of letting the batteries die on the sixteen BNSF locomotives parked at LAUS in late 2015, Metrolink crews jumpstarted those units and repositioned them to the Metrolink Keller Street Yard. To keep their electrical and motive power units in working condition, the non-operating BNSF locomotives remain in temporary storage at the Keller Street Yard. Placed in “automatic mode”, the engines cycle periodically, bringing them up to operating temperature and charging their batteries. Among other things, this periodic cycling of the engines produces wear on the starter motors, flywheels and the diesel engines themselves.

In 2015, a Los Angeles Times article detailed Metrolink’s plans to purchase twenty-nine so-called Tier-4 locomotives. They were touted as state-of-the-art, low pollution passenger locomotives. According to the article, Metrolink intends to replace up to forty-nine of its aging and ill-maintained passenger locomotives over the next several years. Meanwhile, forty BNSF Tier-1 (high powered, high pollution) freight locomotives sit largely idle in the middle of Downtown Los Angeles. Hidden from public view, cycling their massive engines, these locomotives pump out untold amounts of air pollution into the Los Angeles Basin.

Metrolink’s temporary waiver to operate the BNSF freight locomotives will soon expire. When it does, it will be appropriate for the FRA, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), the South Coast Air Quality Management District (AQMD) and the Southern California Regional Rail Authority (SCRRA) to conduct a complete audit of operations and practices at Metrolink.

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By James McGillis at 01:04 PM | Railroad Safety | Comments (0) | Link

Mismatched Braking Systems on Metrolink Trains Presage Disaster - 2016

 

Mismatched Braking Systems on Metrolink Trains Presage Disaster

On October 1, 2015, I wrote about Southern California regional rail passenger carrier Metrolink’s decision to lease forty Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) freight locomotives. In September 2015, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) had notified Metrolink that serious safety deficiencies existed on their Hyundai-Rotem cabcars. The deficiencies involved the February 24, 2015 Oxnard Metrolink collision that injured scores of passengers and took the life of Metrolink Senior Engineer Glenn Steele.

In Oxnard, the “pilot”, a blade that rides just above track level at the front of each cabcar, had failed in a collision with the work truck. As the Metrolink cabcar swept over the truck, the pilot detached and disappeared into the wreckage. Speculation was strong that the detached pilot had contributed to the derailment of the cabcar and the several coaches riding behind it.

Information from NTSB to Metrolink and then via Dan Weikel of the L.A. Times to the public pointed to structural failure. The steel in both the pilot and its support struts was too porous to withstand the load of the Oxnard collision. In addition, welds between the struts and the pilot showed gaps or porosity that weakened the entire assembly. Confronted with an obvious public safety hazard, Metrolink made a snap decision to place a locomotive at each end of every train set.



On December 31, 2015, I rode on one of the first “double-ender” Metrolink trains traveling from Chatsworth to Los Angeles Union Station (LAUS). It was quite a sight to see a 420,000 lb. BNSF locomotive pulling a five-coach train back toward LAUS. The conductor on the train told me that both the BNSF locomotive and the Metrolink locomotive at the other end provided motive power while operating in either direction.

Citing available statistics for the weight of each locomotive and various Metrolink coaches, I wrote in October 2015, “Riding on four axles, current Metrolink diesel locomotives weigh 280,000 lb. At over 420,000 lb., the six-axle BNSF freight locomotives are fifty percent heavier. A 2015 five-car Metrolink train weighed approximately 460,000 lb. By adding a freight locomotive at one end, each "heavy iron" BNSF train set will weigh 880,000 lb., an increase of ninety-one percent.”

The sole purpose of adding the BNSF locomotives was to assure that any motor vehicle encountered on the tracks would be obliterated. Still unclear was how the braking systems on a double-ender would perform while stopping a 440-ton train. I reflected my concern by titling my October 1, 2015 article, “Metrolink Plans for Live Brake-Tests of BNSF ‘Heavy Iron’ Train-Sets on Commuter Tracks”.

At the Chatsworth Station on March 15, 2016, I discovered the answer to my questions about “heavy iron” and braking safety. The answer is that Metrolink double-ender train sets appear to be unsafe. The newly configured Metrolink train sets are a hodgepodge of engines and coaches. The BNSF freight locomotives are better suited to dynamic (engine) braking, rather than using their pneumatic braking system. Each train set also includes an ill-maintained Metrolink locomotive pushing from the rear. In normal “stop and go” usage between Metrolink stations, both locomotives rely on their pneumatic braking systems.

In between the two locomotives are the heavy, steel-sheathed Hyundai-Rotem coaches and lighter monocoque aluminum Bombardier Bi-level coaches. While both locomotives rely on pneumatic “brake blocks” similar to old-fashioned brake shoes, the Hyundai-Rotem coaches employ outboard disk brakes. Depending on their state of refurbishment, the Bombardier Bi-level coaches appear to utilize various combinations of disk brake and block brake systems.

Each locomotive and coach in any train set connects to its mates with high-pressure air hoses. When the engineer applies the pneumatic brakes, every block or disk in the system activates, creating friction and heat, thus slowing the train. With such diversity in ages and types of braking systems, each wheel-truck may receive a different level of braking power, leading to different stress and patterns of wear.

By Metrolink’s own admission, the agency does not conduct major preventative maintenance or periodic overhauls of its locomotive fleet. The agency prefers, instead, to run its locomotives until breakdown, and then conduct maintenance sufficient only to get a broken locomotive back in service. While allowing its current fleet of locomotives to self-destruct on the tracks, Metrolink is spending $338 Million in taxpayer money on new "Tier-4" locomotives. Metrolink may or may not conduct preventative maintenance on its locomotive braking systems. Since Metrolink does not publish information regarding maintenance of braking systems, no one knows.

In addition to aging and mismatched locomotives, Bombardier Bi-level coaches, are included in virtually every Metrolink train set. With over one million miles of service each, wheels with flat spots are a common problem on the Bombardier Bi-level coaches. On those coaches, some wheel-trucks include retrofits to disk brakes while others appear to utilize the older brake-block systems. With so many mismatches and deficiencies elsewhere, the relatively small disk brakes on the newer Hyundai-Rotem coaches and cabcars absorb much of the total braking load.

With all of the mismatched coaches and locomotives, the easiest way to detect brake wear on a Metrolink train is to inspect the Hyundai-Rotem brake rotors, which ride outboard of the wheels. While conducting a casual inspection of the Hyundai-Rotem brakes, I was shocked to see that every visible brake rotor displayed thermal-fatigue cracks (heat checking) radiating from the hub towards the outside edges of the rotors.

I am not a metallurgical engineer, but I have driven many vehicles that include disk brakes. The Hyundai-Rotem disk brakes are larger and feature pneumatic actuation. Otherwise, automotive disk brakes are quite similar to the Hyundai-Rotem type. After an automotive brake inspection, no competent mechanic would allow me to drive away with extensive thermal damage evident on my rotors. With the heat-induced cracks that I recently discovered on Hyundai-Rotem brake rotors, why are those damaged safety components still rolling on Metrolink coaches today? As Metrolink knows from the deadly Glendale (2005), Chatsworth (2008) and Oxnard (2015) collisions, greater attention to safety might prevent the next Metrolink rail disaster.

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By James McGillis at 11:36 PM | Railroad Safety | Comments (1) | Link

One Year After a Metrolink Engineer's Death, Agencies Largely Ignore Rail Safety at Oxnard Crash Scene - 2016

 

One Year After a Metrolink Engineer's Death, Agencies Largely Ignore Rail Safety at Oxnard Crash Scene

In the predawn hours of February 24, 2015, Metrolink Train No. 102 struck a disabled Ford F-450 work truck and trailer at the Fifth St. and Rice Ave. grade crossing in Oxnard, California. Over thirty passengers were injured and Metrolink Senior Engineer Glenn Steele later died from his injuries. After a twenty-four hour driving odyssey from Tucson, Arizona to Oxnard, Mr. Jose Sanchez-Ramirez had made a wrong turn on to the Union Pacific Coast Line tracks. After high centering his rig eighty feet from the intersection, Sanchez-Ramirez had turned on his emergency flashers and left the scene.

After the resulting fiery crash of the Metrolink train, police found Sanchez-Ramirez half a mile from the crash scene, in obvious distress. On February 22, 2016, The Ventura County District Attorney filed a misdemeanor charge of vehicular manslaughter against Jose Sanchez-Ramirez. Immediately, the Union Pacific Railroad, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), Metrolink, the LOSSAN Rail Corridor Agency, Ventura County and the City of Oxnard all breathed a collective sigh of relief. With charges now filed against the truck driver, they were all “off the legal hook” for their collective negligence.

Union Pacific Railroad owns the Coast Line tracks and is responsible for safety of its railroad infrastructure. The CPUC, in conjunction with Caltrans is responsible for rail safety at grade crossings such as Fifth Street, which is also State Highway 34. Metrolink, which operated Train No. 102, is responsible for maintaining its equipment in safe condition. LOSSAN is a joint powers agency responsible for the overall safety of the second busiest rail passenger corridor in the nation. Ventura County and Oxnard are jointly responsible for maintenance of roadways that intersect with the rail corridor.

For each of the above-mentioned public entities to have remained silent and immobile for the past year is unconscionable. Yet, they all have a perfect excuse. In the case of injury accidents on the nation’s rail lines, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) becomes the lead investigative agency. On March 19, 2015, the NTSB issued a preliminary accident report regarding the Oxnard Metrolink collision. Since then, it has published no further findings.

Until the NTSB issues its final report, the responsible companies, agencies and local governments continue to eschew responsibility for the accident. In fact, each of those entities shares part of the blame for the unsafe conditions or for the faulty equipment involved. Let us look at each entity and its involvement in the collision.

Union Pacific Railroad – For an undetermined time prior to the collision, the Union Pacific Railroad had ignored a damaged steel pylon base that supported the Rice Ave. crossbuck. The crossbuck consists of overhead warning signs and flashing lights that activate when a train approaches. Loose wiring on the vehicle warning gates was visible after the crash. At the time, there were no reflective plastic safety pylons installed to warn motorists from turning on to the railroad tracks.

The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) – Various CPUC accounts hold over $42 million in federal funding intended for rail crossing upgrades in California. As of March 2015, the CPUC had allocated none of that money for repair of dangerous crossings such as Fifth & Rice. At the behest of Congresswoman Julia Brownley (D-26th District), the CPUC promised to investigate conditions at the Oxnard crash scene. If the CPUC has indeed studied the issue, it has published no findings on the internet.

Metrolink – The Southern California passenger rail agency has denied responsibility for the Oxnard collision. Instead, they have deflected legal responsibility while pointing to Jose Sanchez-Ramirez and his employer as the responsible parties. For their injuries on Train No. 102, Metrolink has offered passengers no compensation at all. Instead, they offered a one-month free pass for travel on the Metrolink system. If any injured passenger had accepted such a "payment in kind", would Metrolink have later used that fact to absolve itself of contingent liability? I hate to say so, but I believe that they would.

Late in 2015, the NTSB contacted Metrolink with urgent safety information. The NTSB had discovered an equipment failure on Metrolink’s Hyundai-Rotem Cabcar No. 645, which was involved in the Oxnard collision. From the sketchy reports that came from Metrolink headquarters, we can deduce that the “pilot” on Cabcar No. 645 was deficient. The pilot is a blade-like device designed to clear debris from the tracks, thus preventing derailment. Also called an “anti-climbing device”, the pilot on Cabcar No. 645 had detached during the collision with the F-450 work truck. As it disappeared under the cabcar, the detached pilot may have contributed to the catastrophic derailment and decoupling of the cabcar and the second coach in Train No. 102.

In response to the identified safety threat, Metrolink leased forty freight locomotives from Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad (BNSF). Starting in late 2015, Metrolink began phasing in the use of BNSF locomotives on all of its routes. On outbound trips, a BNSF locomotive trails each train like a caboose. After reaching the end of the line, the BNSF locomotive then heads-up each Metrolink train on its return trip to Los Angeles Union Station. Using this “heavy iron” approach, a BNSF freight locomotive should be able to lift any stalled vehicle or debris off the tracks, thus preventing future derailments.

By its own admission, Metrolink no longer maintains its aging fleet of diesel locomotives. On March 11, 2016, a twenty-four year old Metrolink locomotive caught fire in Pomona, California. With the severity of the damage, it is likely that Metrolink locomotive No. 865 will never go back into service. In an ill-conceived and unsafe plan to save money, Metrolink runs its locomotives until they fail and then repairs them only as necessary to put them back into service.

The recent fire in Pomona calls into question the safety and reliability of the entire Metrolink fleet. If Metrolink no longer performs routine maintenance on its locomotives, do they still test, maintain and repair defective braking systems? Even after the derailment and decoupling of the cabcar and the second coach in Oxnard, inadequate breaking systems allowed Locomotive No. 870 to push the entirety of Train No. 102 well past the Rice Ave. grade crossing.

Finally, there is a question regarding the second coach in Train No. 102. It was a Bombardier Bi-level Coach with one million miles of service. In its final report regarding the 2005 Glendale Metrolink collision, the NTSB formally warned Metrolink. It said that the “fixed worktables” in Metrolink Bombardier Bi-level Coaches had contributed to injuries and possible deaths in that incident. After the 2008 Chatsworth Metrolink collision, the final NTSB accident report described death and near dismemberment when passenger torsos impinged upon similar fixed worktables.

Metrolink has since refurbished most of the aging Bombardier coaches in its fleet. Part of that process involves the installation of new fixed worktables, which have a thicker cross-section. Still, passenger at least maintains that derailed Coach No. 206, in which he was injured, had not been upgraded before the February 24, 2015 Oxnard Metrolink collision. That coach, along with the rest of Train No. 102 sits rusting in a Metrolink yard at Moorpark, California. Was the passenger injured by an unsafe, “killer worktable” of the type identified to Metrolink ten years prior? With a quick inspection, the passenger's assertion should be easy to prove or disprove.

By deploying BNSF freight locomotives weighing 460,000 lb., a Metrolink five-car train set now weighs approximately 880,000 lb. As an unintended consequence of this added weight, the obsolete and ill-maintained Metrolink diesel locomotives are now breaking down at an ever-increasing rate. Recently, at the Chatsworth Station, I discovered that Metrolink has secretly replaced some of its own F59PH locomotives with similar equipment provided by R&B Leasing, Inc. As my photos from that station show, Metrolink now has a BNSF locomotive at one end and an R&B locomotive at the other end of some trains. Sadly, Metrolink is becoming an outsourced passenger carrier that can no longer run trains with its own locomotives.

LOSSAN Rail Corridor Agency – Managing all passenger train activity on the Coast Line, from San Diego to San Luis Obispo, LOSSAN is a de facto arm of the Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA). With collocation and co-management at its headquarters in Orange, California, the agency pays little attention to Ventura County and beyond. How often does any LOSSAN agency staffer travel on its rail network to visit Fifth & Rice in Oxnard?

LOSSAN staff should make the arduous, time-consuming and oft delayed rail trip from Orange County to Ventura County. There, at the Fifth St. and Rice Ave. grade crossing they would discover gross deficiencies in safety management. Remember, it was there that Metrolink Senior Engineer Glenn Steele lost his life in February 2015. For LOSSAN staff, it is time to leave its headquarters and visit the “scene of the crime”. After the site visit, I suggest that LOSSAN make a public report about its findings.

Ventura County and City of Oxnard – The saddest agency on the Southern California transportation map is the Ventura County Transportation Commission (VCTC). With no half-cent sales tax for transportation projects, the commission can do little more than wave its hands and hope for the best. Before and after the 2015 Oxnard Metrolink collision, the agency called for action regarding safety improvements at the Fifth St. and Rice Ave. grade crossing. They informed us that it was a serial disaster, with death and dismemberment possible at any moment. What did the City of Oxnard and the County of San Buena Ventura do to mitigate safety issues at that grade crossing during the past year? You guessed it… nothing but verbiage.

The tracks in question are in Oxnard, which is in Ventura County. They are part of the Union Pacific Railroad Coast Line. The LOSSAN Rail Corridor Agency manages passenger trains upon those tracks. On those same tracks, Metrolink Train No. 102 collided with Mr. Sanchez-Ramirez’s abandoned work truck. With the overlapping responsibilities of the companies and agencies listed above, it is impossible to know which entity did what and when. Among them all, here is what has happened in the past year to fix the problems existing at Fifth & Rice.

Unknown parties have replaced a concrete and wrought iron safety wall, previously destroyed by Metrolink Cabcar No. 645. The loose and ragged wiring on the grade crossing gates is no longer visible to the casual observer. Union Pacific, we assume, replaced the southbound Rice Ave. crossbuck with all new equipment, including LED warning lights and gate-arm flashers. Unknown parties have affixed two (count them, two) plastic safety pylons at the scene. Like two small candles in the night they stand, one on either side of the railroad tracks where Jose Sanchez-Ramirez made his erroneous and deadly turn. To her credit, Congresswoman Julia Brownley (D-Westlake Village) recently announced that $1.5 million in federal funds has been secured to create a preliminary design for the proposed Rice Avenue railway-highway grade crossing improvement project.

Occasionally, I visit the makeshift memorials for those who have lost their lives at Fifth & Rice in Oxnard, California. It is a place of personal disaster for many people over many years. Sometimes I feel that I am the only interested person who goes there to observe. If the staff of the legal entities responsible for the problem would jointly visit the site, what might happen? If they did, I know that they and their employers would be shamed into action.

Southern California is famous for its disastrous floods, wildfires and earthquakes. In the past fifteen years, all of those natural disasters combined have taken fewer lives than the grade crossing at Fifth St. and Rice Ave. in Oxnard. Union Pacific Railroad, California PUC, Caltrans, LOSSAN, Metrolink, City of Oxnard and Ventura County, it is well past time to act.

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By James McGillis at 12:28 PM | Railroad Safety | Comments (0) | Link

Secret Autonomous Railroad Pilot Car Testing? Code Name: "Google Pop Car" - 2015

 

Secret Autonomous Railroad Pilot Car Testing? Code Name: "Google Pop Car"

For more than two decades, automobile manufacturers have offered radar systems that activate when a driver shifts the transmission into reverse gear. More recently, backup cameras made the leap from large recreational vehicles to many standard sized automobiles. Although an audible beep from a radar sensor is more effective at getting a driver’s attention, federal law now mandates that by 2018, all light vehicles sold in the U.S. shall include a backup camera.

Recently, automobile manufacturers have developed and deployed “adaptive cruise control”, which will slow a vehicle if it approaches too quickly upon another vehicle. If you purchase a new vehicle today, you can add various crash prevention systems, including “lane departure control”, “collision avoidance braking”, “blind spot warnings”, "adaptive headlights" and more. If you add up all of these features and options, you are well on your way to owning a “self-driving car”, as Google likes to call their autonomous driving vehicle (AV).

Until the 1980s, cup holders were relatively unknown in American cars. Until then, few people ate, drank or made telephone calls while driving. With the advent of “cellular radio”, the “car phone” became popular. With the fast food revolution, so too came cup holders, in-vehicle dining and a host of other distractions. Cordless electric shavers brought personal grooming to the average commuter. Lighted makeup mirrors tempted other commuters to touch up their makeup while driving. When heavy traffic slowed vehicles to a crawl, it became common for drivers to read a book or newspaper during their commute.

By the early 2000s, drivers had even more distractions to deal with. With the release of the first Apple iPhone in 2007, smart phones became ubiquitous, if not at all smart. They offered such features as GPS route guidance and text messaging, along with mobile telephone connectivity. Since then, automotive manufacturers raced to integrate evermore communications and entertainment functions into their vehicles. For instance, many new passenger vehicles offer both Android Auto and Apple CarPlay as options. With the deployment of all these integrated applications, drivers today have more opportunities for inattentive driving than ever before.

Still, it is important to separate the beneficial features in current automobiles from the frivolous, foolish and purely distracting. To me, crash prevention systems are all for the better. Even so, I do not wish to cede control of my vehicle to a self-driving, autonomous computer system. I have driven automobiles for over fifty years. Call me old fashioned, but I plan to drive and control of my own vehicles until I can no longer qualify for a driver’s license.

According to the L.A. Times, Google, Tesla, Toyota and the other corporations have spent billions of dollars developing their own autonomous vehicles. What these companies forgot to do is to ask if we, the driving public want such a vehicle. My guess is that most drivers would prefer to control their own vehicle, rather than sitting passively while their Google Pop Car drives them to work or play. If most of us do not want Google’s self-driving car, toward what useful purpose could the company turn that investment?

To answer that question, Google need look no farther than three miles from their Googleplex headquarters in Mountain View, California. There, adjacent to the Central Expressway is the Mountain View Station, which serves both Caltrain and Amtrak passenger trains. Developed mainly as a freight railroad in the 1880s, the current passenger rail line stretches from Gilroy to its northern terminus in San Francisco. With the ongoing technology boom in the Bay Area, Caltrain operates ninety-two weekday trains along those tracks.

Today, millions of people work and commute back and forth along the San Francisco Peninsula. Some travel on or parallel to the rail lines, while others cross one of the forty grade-level crossings along that rail line. Since 2005, there have been one hundred fifteen Caltrain-related fatalities registered on that busy rail line. Although a few were accidents, the majority of fatalities were determined to be suicides.

According to the San Francisco Examiner, between August and October 2015, there were eight vehicle collisions with trains, four of which were in Burlingame and three of which were at the same intersection. “Running ninety-two trains per day on a corridor with more than forty roadway crossings presents a unique set of challenges,” Caltrain executive director Jim Hartnett said in a statement. “Those challenges have become more difficult with increased traffic congestion and more drivers, cyclists and pedestrians crossing our tracks on a daily basis.”

In addition to vehicle collisions, many of the fatalities occurred when pedestrians walked into the path of an approaching train. Were these pedestrians “texting while walking”, distracted by their smart phones or did they die in preplanned encounters with diesel locomotives? Although that is unclear, many victims appear to hide and then jump on to the tracks when it is too late to avoid a collision. If architects and planners had the luxury of creating a sealed right of way, like the BART system built in the 1970s, they would do it. With more than one hundred years of history, there is no way to seal off the peninsular rail corridor from either vehicle or pedestrian traffic.

Each time a Caltrain passenger train collides with a motorist or pedestrian, the entire commuter system on the San Francisco Peninsula is negatively affected. Meanwhile, the autonomous vehicle group at Google has an opportunity to help save lives, speed commuter rail service and increase revenue in the process. To do this Google should adapt their various autonomous vehicle sensors to a railroad “pilot car”. If Google starts now, it could quickly develop and deploy what I call the “Google Pop Car” on the Caltrain route. Here is how it would work.

The Google Pop Car would be a lightweight, electrically driven autonomous rail car. It would have sensors and cameras capable of spotting both vehicles and pedestrians on or near the railroad tracks. As a “pilot car”, it would lead the way for each Caltrain passenger train, staying far enough ahead to be the eyes and ears for its following train. In an emergency, the Google Pop Car could remotely activate the Positive Train Control (PTC) system, thus halting the train prior to a collision.

As the Google Pop Car approaches a dangerous grade crossing or detects an errant pedestrian, it could activate its safety lights and train horn. If a Google Pop Car warns a distracted pedestrian or potential suicide victim, they might have time to reconsider their actions. Additionally, the Google Pop Car could stream both video and still pictures to the cab of the following locomotive. Utilizing face recognition software, police agencies could later identify potential perpetrators or simple risk-takers, thus allowing intervention or apprehension.

In my scenario, the Google Pop Car would race ahead to the next grade crossing. Upon approach, it would activate its rotating lights and sound its horn. Once the Google Pop Car had secures the crossing, it could depart, always staying ahead of its assigned passenger train. With proper coordination, the passenger train could maintain a steady speed, while ensuring the safety of both pedestrians and vehicular traffic. In the unlikely event of a collision, a lightweight Google Pop Car, with crash absorbing bumpers would cause minimal damage or destruction.

After thorough testing of the Google Pop Car on the Caltrain line, other rail passenger agencies could adopt the technology. Had Google Pop Car technology been available to Metrolink in Southern California it could have saved many lives. Metrolink experienced eleven fatalities in its 2005 Glendale collision, twenty-five fatalities in its 2008 Chatsworth collision and the death of Senior Engineer Glenn Steele in its February 2015 Oxnard collision.

In the Oxnard collision, the “pilot”, a plow-like anti-derailment blade detached from the Metrolink Hyundai Rotem Cab Car. In September 2015, after realizing that its cab cars were unsafe, the Metrolink board met in a closed (possibly illegal) session to discuss its limited options. Almost immediately, Metrolink announced a decision to lease forty “heavy iron” Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) freight locomotives. Rather than exploring new safety technologies such as the Google Pop Car, Metrolink will rely on outmoded, conventional thinking. In coming months, inefficient, high-pollution BNSF freight locomotives will head-up all Metrolink passenger trains. In an “overkill” scenario designed to eradicate errant pedestrians and vehicles, Metrolink will rely on the tonnage of BNSF locomotives.

Essentially all of the technology to produce, test and implement an autonomous railroad pilot car exists today. What is lacking in urban passenger rail systems such as Caltrain and Metrolink is a willingness to embrace the new technologies available for collision avoidance. Moribund and ossified thinking by politically controlled passenger rail agencies guarantees that California will continue to lead the nation in deadly rail collisions along its passenger rail corridors.

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By James McGillis at 03:55 PM | Technology | Comments (0) | Link

Metrolink Plans For Live Brake-Tests of BNSF "Heavy Iron" Train-Sets on Commuter Tracks - 2015

 

Metrolink Plans For Live Brake-Tests of BNSF "Heavy Iron" Train-Sets on Commuter Tracks

On September 26, 2015, Southern California regional rail passenger carrier Metrolink announced a decision to lease forty Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) freight locomotives. As the plan goes into effect, current high-pollution diesel locomotives will continue to provide head-end power for all outbound Metrolink trains. On return trips, BNSF freight locomotive will provide the head-end power. In either direction, one locomotive will provide traction and the other will be deadweight. The cost to lease and outfit the BNSF locomotives with positive train control (PTC) safety systems will exceed $19 million.

Collision vulnerability of pusher trains, with a cab car up front is widely known. During a February 2015 Metrolink collision in Oxnard, California, a Hyundai-Rotem cab car experienced a catastrophic failure of its anti-derailment “plow”. The loss of the plow beneath the cab car may have caused its derailment, along with the remaining coaches and the Metrolink pusher locomotive #870.

Recently, a source close to the Metrolink investigation told me, “I believe that the NTSB informed the railroad about the plow failure. It is amazing that they are replacing the Rotem cab cars with (BNSF) engines, using an ‘emergency provision’ related to safety.” Another trusted source told me, “The BNSF freight units are about 50% heavier and have six axles to bear that weight. However, in spite of their horsepower, they have poor acceleration and limited top speed. The resulting longer trains will also complicate the operation at storage tracks, some of which will not be able to accommodate an extra vehicle. If instituted, I predict a major service meltdown.”

Diesel locomotives utilize two separate braking systems. With dynamic breaking engaged, the diesel engine slows to an idle, while the electric motor becomes an electrical generator. The generator provides resistance to the drive train, thus slowing the train’s wheels. All of this takes time. On a freight locomotive, the pneumatic system provides faster or emergency braking. It uses pressurized air to actuate cylinders and rods, which impinge upon “brake blocks”. The brake blocks, which are analogous to automotive break shoes, apply friction directly to the train’s steel wheels.

It is common knowledge that Metrolink has ceased scheduled maintenance on its decades-old locomotives. If a locomotive fails, they attempt to fix it. Otherwise, Metrolink keeps running each locomotive until the next failure. This raises obvious questions about reliability and safety. It also begs the question; does Metrolink still conduct scheduled or preventative maintenance on its locomotive braking systems? A simple audit of its maintenance contractor, Bombardier Transit Corporation, would show whether they provide periodic maintenance on Metrolink locomotive brake systems.

In the newer, Hyundai-Rotem cab cars and coaches, disk brake technology now prevails. Under Rotem’s high-tech scheme, the cab car’s wheels support outboard disks, or rotors as part of the pneumatic braking system. Typically, disk brakes act more efficiently than “brake shoes” to slow a moving vehicle. This technology, which is new to Metrolink, comes at a price. That price is what we call “the learning curve”.

At its home location in South Korea, Hyundai-Rotem reportedly paid a $6.3 million settlement last year over brake defects and mechanical malfunctions. Rather than field testing its various consists of coaches, cab cars and locomotives, Metrolink assumed that all of its braking systems would be compatible. Through ignorance or indifference, Metrolink failed to perform live braking trials for their typical, odd assortment of coaches.

Still unknown is how a mixture of old and new braking systems affected the derailment of all five cars during the 2015 Oxnard collision. New technology braking systems installed on the three Rotem coaches may have overwhelmed the braking capacity of the single, obsolete Bombardier bi-level coach.

Even after the cab car and other coaches had derailed, a poorly maintained Metrolink locomotive kept pushing from the rear. Photographic evidence suggests that slow braking at the pusher-end popped the rigid Bombardier coach loose from both of its couplings. Once the Bombardier coach derailed, it traveled farther off course than even the doomed Hyundai-Rotem cab car. Other than the death of Metrolink Senior Engineer Glenn Steele, the most serious injuries occurred within the obsolete Bombardier bi-level coach.

Metrolink’s recent decision to lease forty, six-axle BNSF diesel freight locomotives was hasty. If the newly devised train sets cannot operate better than the mixed-consist trains currently in operation, both passengers and motorists may be at additional risk. Riding on four axles, current Metrolink diesel locomotives weigh 280,000 lb. At over 420,000 lb., the BNSF freight engines are fifty percent heavier. A current five-car Metrolink train weighs approximately 460,000 lb. By adding a freight locomotive at one end, the BNSF train set will weigh 880,000 lb., an increase of ninety-one percent.

In contrast to the diminutive anti-derailment plow on the Hyundai-Rotem cab cars, the BNSF freight locomotives should be able to clear almost any vehicle or debris from the tracks. However, the addition of such “heavy iron” on each Metrolink train raises questions about fuel consumption, environmental pollution, braking systems and overall reliability.

Fuel Consumption – A twelve-cylinder, turbocharged two-stroke diesel engine powers each Metrolink EMD F59PH locomotive. None of those locomotives is younger than twenty years. By current standards, they are “gas hogs”, inefficiently providing traction to the drive wheels. To get the idea, picture a 1990 Mercedes 190D diesel automobile spewing nitrogen oxide and particulates into the air as you drive behind it.

By effectively “dragging” one locomotive or the other at all times, the dead weight of the nonfunctional locomotive will drastically increase Metrolink fuel consumption. In the past, some railroads have solved lightweight cab car derailments with old-fashioned innovation. They have replaced cab cars with stripped-down locomotives. With their diesel engines and traction motors removed, these so-called “coffin cars” provide sufficient weight upfront to preclude most derailments. Admittedly any "coffin cars" utilized on Metrolink tracks would require addition of Positive Train Control (PTC) safety systems. Still, that could cost a lot less than the recently approved $19 million BNSF lease.

Environmental Pollution – A decade after the newest Metrolink F59PH locomotives came into service, the U.S. EPA’s 2005 Tier 2 locomotive emissions standards took effect. Given their age and power plants, all Metrolink locomotives qualify as pre Tier 2. That designation makes them among the worst polluters currently active on any U.S. passenger railroad.

With the recent deception perpetrated by World Wide Volkswagen Group, the public is now aware that nitrogen oxide is a greenhouse gas (GHG) 300-times more detrimental than carbon dioxide itself. In this case, even a single Tier 0-1 diesel locomotive pollutes the air at a greater rate than hundreds, if not thousands of errant Volkswagen diesel engines.

Braking Power – Mixed-consist train sets require testing to determine how they will perform under emergency braking procedures. Using readily available metering and measurement devices, Metrolink should test each consist of coaches and locomotives. During a full speed test, the locomotive engineer would initiate emergency braking. Although this would not simulate a collision, it would “stress test” both old and the new braking and coupling systems in a live environment. Until it provides results of live emergency brake testing, Metrolink’s mismatched train sets may continue to endanger both passengers and the public.

Reliability – Over the years, the uptime of Metrolink locomotives has deteriorated. As of 2013, thirty of Metrolink's fifty-two locomotives were due for complete overhaul. By 2015, not one of those obsolete locomotives had received more than a "Band-Aid" overhaul. Instead, as it awaits their replacement with new Tier 4 locomotives, Metrolink is running its current fleet of locomotives until failure.

The agency’s lack of scheduled maintenance reminds me of oil exploration on the North Slope of Alaska. There, when an oilfield declines, the operator discontinues periodic maintenance well before final closure. In such cynical, “work until failure” schemes, oil companies curtail periodic maintenance in order to save money. In such cases, reliability and safety take a backseat to corporate profits.

Whether in Alaska oilfields or on Southern California rails, the end of periodic maintenance and overhaul signals a decline in both reliability and safety. With an oil field, the company can wait for repairs, clean up any spilled oil and then resume pumping. With Metrolink, the consequences of its current “work until failure” plan include fewer riders, less revenue and potential catastrophic failure of the Metrolink system.

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By James McGillis at 05:56 PM | | Comments (0) | Link